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ARGUMENT 
Amicus Has Failed To Demonstrate That Eric Scott's Contempt Conviction Is 
Precluded By The First Amendment 
Eric James Scott appeals from the district court's order affirming the 
judgment of conviction entered upon the magistrate court's finding that Scott was 
guilty of criminal contempt. After the parties completed appellate briefing, the 
Idaho Supreme Court granted the American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho's 
(hereinafter "Amicus") Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae. (9/19/13 
Order.) Amicus subsequently submitted briefing to this Court. 
While the state largely relies on its previously submitted briefing, it will 
respond to some of the arguments presented in Amicus' brief. 
A. Scott's Contempt Conviction Is Not Precluded By The First Amendment 
Amicus argues that Scott's contempt conviction is precluded by the First 
Amendment. (Amicus brief, pp.1-10.) In so doing, Amicus appears to contend 
that the magistrate and district courts should have applied the stringent "clear 
and present danger" constitutional standard, or some other heightened First 
Amendment review, to Scott's conduct. (Id.) However, because the caselaw 
relied on by Amicus is distinguishable from the present case, Amicus has failed 
to show that the type of conduct Scott engaged in is subject to enhanced First 
Amendment protection, or that the First Amendment precludes Scott's 
conviction. 
Amicus cites In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962) for the 
proposition that "an attorney's words alone 'cannot amount to a contempt of 
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court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create an obstruction which 
blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty."' (Amicus brief, p.1.) In 
McConnell, the United States Supreme Court analyzed a federal trial court's 
application of 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1 ), which regulates the "drastic procedures of 
summary contempt power." McConnell, 370 U.S. at 234. The Court recognized 
Congress' legislative intent to limit the use of these "drastic procedures" to 
situations which constituted an "immediate interruption of court business." ~ 
McConnell does not expressly reference the First Amendment, and instead 
simply holds that McConnell's conduct did not actually interrupt the court's 
business, and thus could not be the subject of a summary contempt proceeding 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1 ). ~ at 230-236. 
As in the federal courts, summary contempt in Idaho is a "drastic" judicial 
power in which the contemnor is not given prior notice of the charge of contempt 
or an opportunity to determine whether the charges are true. I.R.C.P. 75(a)(4). 
An Idaho judge may only exercise this expansive power where the contempt is 
committed in open court in the immediate presence of the judge. I.R.C.P. 75(b). 
Scott, however, was not held in summary contempt. Instead, he was subjected 
to non-summary contempt proceedings, in which he was entitled to, and 
received, prior notice of the contempt charge and an opportunity for a hearing. 
I.R.C.P. 75(a)(5). (R., pp.6-7.) Neither McConnell, 18 U.S.C. § 401(1), nor the 
requirements of I.C.R.P. 75(a)(4) have any application to the present case. 
Further, to the extent McConnell may be instructive as to First 
Amendment contempt jurisprudence, Amicus' reliance on and selective quotation 
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from that opinion are misguided. While Amicus quotes (Amicus brief, p.1 ), from 
McConnell the proposition that an attorney's words alone "cannot amount to a 
contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create an 
obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty," it 
omits the portion of the quotation that speaks to one of the state's arguments on 
appeal. In full, the relevant quotation reads, "The arguments of a lawyer in 
presenting his client's case strenuously and persistently cannot amount to a 
contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create an 
obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty." 
McConnell, 370 U.S. at 236. As the state has asserted (Respondent's brief, 
pp.14-21), an attorney's conduct has more limited First Amendment protections 
where he has ceased acting in such manner as to "strenuously and persistently" 
present his client's case, and instead is utilizing the judicial proceedings to 
express his own personal grievances with the court, or make unsupported 
accusations of judicial misconduct. 
Certainly, the United States Supreme Court and other appellate courts 
have justifiably endeavored to protect an attorney's zealous advocacy for his or 
her client. In In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (ih Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals recognized McConnell as requiring "that attorneys be given 
great latitude in the area of vigorous advocacy," and that "[a]ppellate courts must 
ensure that trial judges (or the jury on remand) are not left free to manipulate the 
balance between vigorous advocacy and obstructions so as to chill effective 
advocacy when deciding lawyer contempts." Dellinger, 461 at 398. Additionally, 
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"[l]t is the right of counsel for every litigant to press his claim, even if it appears 
farfetched and untenable, to obtain the court's considered ruling. Full enjoyment 
of that right, with due allowance for the heat of controversy, will be protected by 
appellate courts when infringed by trial courts." Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 
(1975). However, if a court's "ruling is adverse, there is no right of counsel to 
resist or insult the judge." State ex rel. Tannenbaum v. Clark, 838 S.W.2d 26, 
34-35 (Mo. App. 1992) (citing Maness, 449 U.S. at 458). 
This implication of such precedent is that while legal advocacy is strictly 
protected, both through the First Amendment and proper application of the 
controlling statutory and common contempt law, conduct engaged in by 
attorneys in the course of an ongoing legal proceeding which serves no purpose 
of advocacy is not entitled to identical constitutional or statutory protection. 
Additionally, while the magistrate and district courts did not expressly hold 
that Scott's conduct directly interrupted or obstructed the court's business, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that "[a]n attorney's charge of 
judicial bias inherently obstructs the judicial function by undermining the court's 
ability regulate the trial." In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1985). Scott's 
conduct was clearly intended to disrupt the court simply because it was 
calculated to vindicate his own personal grievances rather than to advocate for a 
client or otherwise further the ends of justice. 
Amicus' reliance on the recent opinion In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814 (3 rd Cir. 
2013) is also misplaced. In Kendall, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a 
trial judge's contempt conviction. kl The Court recognized that a judicial 
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opinion, the forum of the judge's allegedly contemptuous conduct, "occupies the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values" and is thus "entitled to 
special protection." kl at 824. Correspondingly, the Court applied the stringent 
"clear and present danger" test, under which the state was required to show that 
the judge's conduct constituted a "clear and present danger of prejudicing 
ongoing proceedings." kl at 825-830. The United States Supreme Court has 
previously applied this "clear and present danger" standard in a series of cases 
in which members of the press were held in contempt for extrajudicial statements 
about ongoing judicial proceedings. kl at 825-826 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 
U.S. 367,376 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,348 (1946); Bridges 
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260-263 (1941)). 
Amicus, and Scott, have argued that the lower courts should have applied 
this or some other similarly heightened First Amendment standard to his 
conduct. Neither Scott nor Amicus, however, has established that Scott's written 
tirade against Judge Watkins, conducted during an ongoing legal proceeding but 
outside the context of any client advocacy, is entitled to the same First 
Amendment protections as either a judicial opinion, or a non-lawyer's public 
extrajudicial comments on a pending case. 
Finally, the state wishes to respond to Amicus' characterization of Scott's 
conviction and the state's role in prosecuting it. Amicus characterizes Scott's 
conviction as one "for criticizing a judge," and the state's interest in prosecuting 
the case as being rooted in a desire to "shelter[] a judge from criticism." (Amicus 
brief, pp. 1, 3.) Amicus also considers it "odd" that the state "seems to prefer that 
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Scott have aired his criticism widely through the mass media, rather than in a 
motion filed with the Magistrate Division in an obscure misdemeanor case." 
(Amicus brief, pp.4-5, n.1) 
Such characterizations unfairly misstate the nature of Judge Watkins' 
contempt complaint, and the state's prosecution of it. As the state has 
recognized (Respondent's brief, p.16), attorneys and other individuals enjoy a 
First Amendment right to criticize judges under many circumstances. Lawyers 
have broad First Amendment rights to engage in public out-of-court criticism of 
judges, and to raise relevant and colorable claims in the context of proper 
advocacy during ongoing court proceedings. (kl (citations omitted).) The state 
has no "preference" regarding any constitutionally protected means by which 
Scott may wish to express his disfavor with Judge Watkins, nor does it have an 
interest in quelling such constitutionally protected speech, no matter how widely 
it is distributed. Scott's conviction was based on the nature and circumstances 
of his unsupported accusations of judicial misconduct and bias, not simply of any 
"criticism" of Judge Watkins. Scott remains free to express criticism of Judge 
Watkins or any other judge in any number of constitutionally protected means 
and venues. Scott also had the constitutional right to "criticize" Judge Watkins in 
the context of proper advocacy for his former client, such as through a motion to 
reconsider Watkins' unfavorable pretrial order, by appealing that order, or even 
through a motion to disqualify Judge Watkins for bias or misconduct - had Scott 
been able to support any of his corresponding allegations. 
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Contrary to Amicus' argument, the type of conduct Scott engaged in is not 
entitled to heightened First Amendment protection. Amicus has likewise failed to 
show that the First Amendment precludes Scott's contempt conviction. 
DATED this 4th day of November, 2013. 
MARKW0LSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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